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
President
Read
during briefing
by McCone
BKS

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET


VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
34168 10-63
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO (Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA (U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
COLOMBIA
BRAZIL
BRITISH GUIANA
BR. GUIANA
Amuay
Coro
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
Maracaibo
Cabimas
Ule
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
CARACAS
La Guaira
Valencia
Maracay
Carupano
Mene Grande
Quiriquire
Maturín
Tucupita
Ciudad Bolívar
Cucuta
Río Orinoco
Río Apure
Río Arauca
Río Meta
Río Caura
Río Caroní
Río Negro
Río Uraricoera
Río Branco
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2

1. Venezuela

a. The country's six presidential candidates have swung into the home stretch of their campaigns. So have the terrorists, who are still trying hard to sabotage next Sunday's vote.

b. There is little doubt that the terrorist effort has all-out Cuban support. Castro looks on Venezuela as his prime target in Latin America and would do everything in his power to prevent President Betancourt from finishing his term.

c. So far, the terrorists have tried to intimidate the candidates by harassing political rallies, bombing their party headquarters in various cities, and threatening them with assassination. They have tried to scare voters from the polls by creating a general atmosphere of lawlessness. Kidnappings, like the one yesterday morning of Colonel Chenault, are part of the pattern.

d. The government counterattack is under the personal direction of Betancourt, who is as determined to finish out his term and turn over power to a freely-elected successor as Castro is to prevent this.

(Cont'd)

e. Yesterday it was announced that the carrying of firearms by anyone outside the security forces was forbidden until the elections are over.

f. Some 3,000 reservists have been called up to protect the polls. Leaves are being cancelled and all security forces are maintaining a high state of alert.

2. South Vietnam

a. We now have a fuller account from official US sources of the Viet Cong attack on two mountain villages mentioned in Tuesday's Checklist.

b. This account makes it clear that the earlier press versions, which spoke of 1,000 missing villagers, were highly colored.

c. Our present information is that the attack, in company strength, was successfully repulsed. The Viet Cong suffered some 30 casualties; government losses were six killed, three wounded and 39 missing.

(Cont'd)

d. As is usual in these cases, the villagers began to trickle back once the Viet Cong left.

e. This episode aside, we see a number of indications that the Communists will try to sustain the higher level of military activity they have kept up since the coup.

f. The Communist radio has called for more attacks in an effort to destroy strategic hamlets and "develop" Viet Cong forces. In support of this, Viet Cong communications traffic has been unusually heavy and has involved a large volume of high priority traffic and special alert patterns.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Israel

a. We have some reason to believe that the Israelis are developing a surface-to-surface missile of their own.

b. A reliable clandestine source says that an Israeli representative is trying to buy US stable platforms for the inertial guidance system of a missile with a range of 300-350 miles. He wanted delivery in six to twelve months. There have been several earlier reports that

(Cont'd)

Israel is buying missile components in the US and England.

c. We think this missile program is independent of another Israeli venture: Tel Aviv's contract with a French firm, Marcel Dassault, for the development of a system which will be able to deliver a 1,600-pound warhead to a maximum range of 300 miles.

4. USSR-India

a. Moscow has promised the Indians to ship the equipment for one surface-to-air (SAM) training site early next month.

b. The Soviets had agreed to provide eight SAM sites. The rest will probably not be sent until the Indians have learned to handle the equipment about a year from now.

c. As we noted last Sunday, there are some Indians who have doubts about the Soviet willingness to live up to the letter of their military aid agreements with New Delhi.

(Cont'd)

d. They call into question especially the contract for the Soviets to set up in India a facility to assemble MIG fighters--an enterprise which has appeared somewhat impractical from the beginning.

e. We do note, however, that Soviet aircraft specialists working on the project were still in New Delhi in early November. (INTERCEPTS)

5. Burma


a. Ne Win has followed up his action in breaking off talks with the Burmese Communists by arresting over 700 of their number.

b. Ne Win had been trying to lure the faction-ridden Communists into a "national front." However, he found the demands of the Communist negotiators, some of whom had only just returned from long exile in Peiping, to be impossible.

c. This will probably lead to renewed fighting between the army and Communist guerrillas in the hills.

d. More trouble can also be expected from the rebellious ethnic minorities like the Karens and the

(Cont'd)



South Vietnam
NORTH VIETNAM
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
CAMB.
VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
LAOS
Quang Ngai
THAILAND
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
Phuoc Vinh
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Phan Thiet
SAIGON
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
My Tho
Vung Tau
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
0 STATUTE MILES 150
34235

Kachins, whose demands for greater autonomy have been rejected in Rangoon.

e. US officials on the spot doubt that the army, hobbled by poor leadership and its many political responsibilities, will be any more effective in dealing with the problem this time than in past anti-insurgency campaigns.

6. Cambodia

a. Sihanouk has signed an accord setting up regular air service between Cambodia and Communist China. A similar agreement with Hanoi is in the works.

b. These lines are significant largely as gestures by Peiping and Hanoi to bolster Sihanouk's sense of importance. Neither would be a paying proposition commercially and both could flounder before the first paying passenger enplanes unless rights to overfly Laos can be obtained. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

7. Greece

a. It looks more and more as if Papandreou, who squeaked through to a narrow upset victory over ex-premier Karamanlis in the 3 November elections, will not be able to form a government.

(Cont'd)

b. His party does not have a parliamentary majority, so he needs support from either Karamanlis' party on the right or from the Communists. The military has apparently been pressing Karamanlis to withhold that support. He does not need much urging.

c. The military has also let it be known that it would consider Papandreou's acceptance of Communist support as sufficient reason for a coup d'etat.

d. In addition to this military string-pulling, the royal family is also meddling--not for the first time. Should Papandreou fail to form a government, the palace intends to pass the mandate to Karamanlis, believing that he too would fail.

e. This would then open the way, the palace calculates, for a compromise premier more amenable to palace influence.

8. Brazil

a. President Goulart and his opponents are keeping political tensions in Brazil high.

(Cont'd)

b. Comments by Goulart, that "social disaster" is sure if his program is not passed soon, have drawn sharp rejoinders from moderate and conservative figures and have fed rightist coup plotting.

c. Strains are also growing in the military following the arrest of a young officer who refused last month to execute an order to arrest Governor Lacerda, a leading conservative spokesman and likely presidential candidate.

NOTES


A. USSR Simultaneous activity this morning on the Tyuratam missile test range, satellite tracking nets and Soviet space support ships in the Atlantic probably represented an attempt to launch an unmanned earth satellite. The launch apparently failed on the pad or was cancelled at the last moment. It may be tried again soon. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Rumania-US Rumanian officials are about to award a US firm, Ferguson and Company of Cleveland, Ohio, a $32 million contract to help build the huge Galati steel plant. The Rumanians are pressing ahead with this project in the face of Soviet efforts to discourage it in various ways, most importantly by refusing to underwrite the scheme to any substantial degree.

C. Turkey The New Turkey Party has followed the Peasant Party in withdrawing from the present three-party coalition government. This means that the coalition has to all intents and purposes collapsed, even though no formal action will be taken until Prime Minister Inonu returns from Washington this weekend.

D. Thailand The Thai doctors attending Sarit now admit for the first time that the Prime Minister is in critical condition. Our doctor agrees with this prognosis. US officials in Bangkok believe that the most likely successor would be Thanom Kittikachorn, now deputy prime minister and minister of defense. Thanom is not likely to last long, however, since he is neither a strong personality nor a figure of great weight in the military hierarchy.

(Cont'd)



MOROCCO
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
LIBYA
UAR
(EGYPT)
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
FR. SOMAL.
SOMALI
REPUBLIC
GAMBIA
SENEGAL
PORT. GUINEA
GUINEA
SIERRA
LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY
COAST
UPPER VOLTA
GHANA
TOGO
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
GABON
CONGO
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
UGANDA
KENYA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
RWANDA BURUNDI
ZANZIBAR
CABINDA
ANGOLA
FED. OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY
REPUBLIC
SOUTH-WEST
AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND

E. Indonesia-Philippines A Philippine foreign office man states that everything was set, as we noted yesterday, for Sukarno to visit Manila today. This official says, however, that the visit was postponed as a result of Macapagal's decision to attend President Kennedy's funeral.

F. Indonesia Djakarta is giving every indication that it will hold up final action on the long-pending oil contracts with US companies in an attempt to smoke us out on the question of US aid policy toward Indonesia.

G. Rwanda-Burundi Tribal refugees from Rwanda, now in Burundi, seem bent on making trouble between the two countries. Some 3,000 of their number were reported yesterday to be moving toward the frontier. They have little military capability, but blood could flow and require UN intervention.

H. USSR-Congo As a further token of the withdrawal of Soviet diplomats we have noted that the Soviet diplomatic communications link between Moscow and Leopoldville was shut down last Saturday. (INTERCEPTS)